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The wide range of existing estimates of the annual loss—from a few billion dollars to hundreds of 
billions—reflects several difficulties. Companies conceal their losses and some are not aware of what has 
been taken. Intellectual property is hard to value. Some estimates relied on surveys, which provide very 
imprecise results unless carefully constructed. One common problem with cybersecurity surveys is that 
those who answer the questions “self-select,” introducing a possible source of distortion into the results. 
Given the data collection problems, loss estimates are based on assumptions about scale and effect—
change the assumption and you get very different results. These problems leave many estimates open  
to question. 
The Components of Malicious Cyber Activity
In this initial report we start by asking what we should count in estimating losses from cybercrime  
and cyber espionage. We can break malicious cyber activity into six parts: 
• The loss of intellectual property and business confidential information 
• Cybercrime, which costs the world hundreds of millions of dollars every year 
• The loss of sensitive business information, including possible stock market manipulation
• Opportunity costs, including service and employment disruptions, and reduced trust for online activities
• The additional cost of securing networks, insurance, and recovery from cyber attacks
• Reputational damage to the hacked company
Put these together and the cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage to the global economy is probably 
measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars. To put this in perspective, the World Bank says that 
global GDP was about $70 trillion in 2011. A $400 billion loss—the high end of the range of probable 
costs—would be a fraction of a percent of global income. But this begs several important questions 
about the full benefit to the acquirers and the damage to the victims from the cumulative effect  
of cybercrime and cyber espionage.
Using Analogy to Set the Bounds for the Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity
We use several analogies where costs have already been quantified to provide an idea of the scope  
of the problem, allowing us to set rough bounds—a ceiling and a floor—for the cost of malicious cyber 
activity, by comparing it to other kinds of crime and loss.
Introduction
Is cybercrime, cyber espionage, and other malicious cyber activities 
what some call “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history,” 
or is it what others say is a “rounding error in a fourteen trillion 
dollar economy?”  
• Car Crashes: One way to think about the costs 
of malicious cyber activity is that people bear the 
cost of car crashes as a tradeoff for the conve-
nience of automobiles; similarly they may bear the 
cost of cyber crime and espionage as a tradeoff 
for the benefits to business of information tech-
nology. The Center for Disease Control estimated 
the cost of car crashes in the US at $99 billion 
in 2010. The American Automobile Association 
estimated the 2010 cost of at $168 billion. 
• Piracy: A weakly governed space exploited by 
criminals could describe some oceanic areas as 
well as the internet. The International Maritime 
Bureau estimated the annual cost of piracy as 
somewhere between $1 billion and $16 billion  
in 2005 (cyber is not the only field where estima-
tion is difficult). To put these figures in context, 
the annual value of maritime trade in 2005 was 
$7.8 trillion, which means piracy costs equaled  
at most 0.02 percent of the total.1
• Pilferage: Companies accept rates of 
“pilferage” or “inventory shrinkage” as part of 
the cost of doing business. For retail companies 
in the US, this falls between 1.5% and 2.0% 
of annual sales—one 2008 estimate put 
pilferage losses at 1.7%. Using a “pilferage” 
approach that assumed the same rate of loss for 
malicious cyber activity would put the upper limit 
somewhere between 0.5% and 2% of national 
income. For the US, this would be $70 billion to 
$280 billion. A central problem for the “pilferage 
theory,” however, is that many companies do not 
know the extent of their losses, leading them to 
make decisions about what is an acceptable loss 
based on inadequate information. 
• Crime and Drugs: One frequently heard 
comparison is that malicious cyber activity is 
more lucrative than the drug trade. This begs 
the question of whether we know the drug 
trade’s value. In 2012 the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime estimated the cost of all transnational 
organized crime as $870 billion, or 1.2% of 
global GDP.2  It estimated $600 billion of this 
figure came from illegal drug trafficking. If cyber 
losses also cost the same share of global GDP, 
the cost could be more than $600 billion.
What’s the Harm?
If we are right in assuming that “tolerated costs” 
from malicious cyber activity falls into the same 
range as car crashes, pilferage, and drugs, this is 
a “ceiling” for an estimate of loss. They suggest 
that at most, cybercrime, cyber espionage costs 
less than 1% of GDP. For the US, for example, 
our best guess is that losses may reach $100 
billion annually. To put this in perspective, annual 
expenditures on research and development in  
the US are $400 billion a year and $100 million  
in stolen IP does not translate into $100 million  
in gain for the acquirer.
One difficulty lies in quantifying the cost of 
damage to national security. The theft of military 
technology could make nations less secure by 
strengthening potential opponents or harming 
export markets in aerospace, advanced materi-
als, or other high-tech products. There is a link 
between cyber espionage directed at commercial 
targets and cyber espionage targeted on military 
technology. It is often the same actors pursuing 
a collection plan that targets both military and 
commercial sources. Engaging in cyber espionage 
can improve cyber attack capabilities. We can-
not accurately assess the dollar value of the loss 
in military technology but we can say that cyber 
espionage shifts the terms of engagement in favor 
of foreign competitors. 
The effect of malicious cyber activities on jobs 
needs further work. The Commerce Department 
estimated in 2011 that $1 billion in exports equaled 
5,080 jobs.3 This means that the high end estimate 
of $100 billion in losses from cyber espionage 
would translate into 508,000 lost jobs. While this 
translates into a third of a percent decrease in 
employment, this is not the “net” loss as many 
workers will find other jobs. The real concern 
might be if the lost jobs are in manufacturing or 
other high paying sectors. If workers displaced 
by cyber espionage do not find jobs that pay as 
well or better, the victim country would be worse 
off. The effect of cyber espionage may be to move 
workers from high paying blue-collar jobs into 
lower paying work or unemployment. 
1 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/ 
RAND_MG697.pdf
2 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/October/transnational-
crime-proceeds-in-billions-victims-in-millions-says-unodc-chief.html
3 International Trade Administration, Jobs Supported by Exports: An 
Update, March 12, 2012, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/
public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003639.pdf
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Next Steps for Estimation
Putting a number on the cost of cybercrime and 
cyber espionage is the headline, but the heart of 
the matter is the effect on trade, technology, and 
competitiveness. Answering these questions will 
help us put the problem in its strategic context. 
While the cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage 
to the global economy is likely billions of dollars 
every year, the dollar amount, large as it is likely 
to be, may not fully reflect damage to the global 
economy. Cyber espionage and crime may slow 
the pace of innovation, distort trade, and create 
social costs from job loss. This larger effect may  
be more important than any actual number and  
it is one we will focus on in our final report.
Putting Malicious Cyber Activity in Context
CriMiNAl ACTiON ESTiMATEd COST PErCENT Of GdP SOurCE
GlObAl
Piracy $1 billion to $16 billion 0.008% to 0.02% IMB
Drug Trafficking $600 billion 5% UNODC
Global cyber activity $300 billion to $1 trillion 0.4% to 1.4% Various
uS ONly
Car Crashes $99 billion to $168 billion 0.7% to 1.2% CDC, AAA
Pilferage $70 billion to $280 billion 0.5% to 2% NRF
uS- cyber activity $24 billion to $120 billion 0.2% to 0.8% Various
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Extracting value from the computers of unsus-
pecting companies and government agencies is a 
big business. The size of any loss, however, is the 
subject of intense dispute. Is this what one senior 
official called “the greatest transfer of wealth in 
human history,” or is it what a leading economist 
called a “rounding error in a fourteen trillion  
dollar economy?”   
Cyber crimes against banks and other financial 
institutions probably cost many hundreds of millions 
of dollars every year. Cyber theft of intellectual 
property and business-confidential information 
probably costs developed economies billions of 
dollars—how many billions is an open question. 
These losses could just be the cost of doing 
business or they could be a major new risk for 
companies and nations as these illicit acquisitions 
damage global economic competitiveness and 
undermine technological advantage. 
Previous estimates of the annual losses to 
businesses from cyber espionage show a startling 
variation, ranging from few billion dollars to 
hundreds of billions. The wide range of estimates 
reflects the difficulty of collecting data. Companies 
conceal their losses and some are not aware of 
what has been taken. Intellectual property is hard 
to value in the abstract. Estimates are often based 
on anecdotes or surveys. These problems combine 
to leave some previous estimates open to question. 
The cost of malicious cyber activity involves more 
than the loss of financial assets or intellectual 
property. There are opportunity costs, damage 
to brand and reputation, consumer losses from 
fraud, the opportunity costs of service disruptions 
“cleaning up” after cyber incidents, and the cost 
of increased spending on cybersecurity. Each of 
these categories must be approached carefully, 
but in combination, they help us gauge the cost to 
societies. In many cases we have used the United 
States as an example. This reflects, more than 
anything else, the fact that data is more readily 
available from US sources. 
In an ideal world, aggregating the various factors 
would be straightforward. This is not possible. In 
all of the categories of malicious cyber activity, 
the data is incomplete. Data collection is com-
plicated by definitional difficulties. Should cyber 
crime, for example, include all crimes committed 
using cyber means or only those crimes that could 
only be committed with cyber tools, leaving out 
crimes that would have otherwise been commit-
ted via traditional criminal means. One way to 
think about this is to ask, if there was no internet, 
would this crime have occurred?  
Two important caveats shape this comprehensive 
view. First, we will try to estimate “net” loss, which 
is particularly important for estimating the effect of 
a temporary disruption of service. A store knocked 
offline for a day may lose $10,000, but if customers 
wait or go to another store, the net loss to the 
Crime Pays—But How Well?
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economy is much smaller. Second, we will try to use 
market values rather than a value assigned by the 
victim. A company may spend a billion on research, 
but it is the expected return on this research that 
determines its worth, not the expenditure. 
A rough guess? Losses to the US (the country 
where data is most accessible) may reach $100 
billion annually. The cost of cybercrime and cyber 
espionage to the global economy is some multiple 
of this likely measured in hundreds of billions of 
dollars. To put this in perspective, the World Bank 
says that global GDP was about $70 trillion in 
2011. A $300 billion loss—and losses are probably 
in this range—would be four tenths of one percent 
of global income. But this seemingly trivial amount 
begs several important questions about the full 
benefit to the acquirers and the damage to the 
victims from the cumulative effect of continuous 
losses in cyberspace. This question of the effect  
and consequences of the loss is more important 
than any actual number and it is one we will focus 
on in this essay and in our final report. 
We reviewed previous studies to develop our own 
understanding of the problem. For example, a 2010 
estimate by a German corporate security association 
of Germany’s losses of intellectual property put 
them at a minimum of perhaps $24 billion (most, 
but not all, from cyber espionage).4 Since the US 
GDP is roughly five times that of Germany, a very 
crude extrapolation would project the size of the 
German loss onto the larger American economy 
and put an upper bound for US losses at $120 
billion.5 Another report, widely criticized, put 
the cost to the UK at $27 billion.6 These figures 
represented about 2% of the UK’s GDP and would 
translate into about $280 billion for the US. Three 
quarters of these losses were ascribed to losses 
of intellectual property by companies, based on 
a series of projections and assumptions about IP 
valuation that others questioned. 
Some previous estimates of the cost of cybercrime 
relied on surveys, which are notoriously imprecise 
unless very carefully constructed. Surveying a few 
companies or even a few hundred companies and 
then extrapolating costs from their responses is 
a dangerous methodology. There are significant 
differences among economic sectors in vulner-
ability. There are rules for deciding on sample size 
and selection, but imperfect samples are a com-
mon flaw in surveys. Many previous studies use a 
sample population that is too small for us to feel 
confident in the results. One common problem in 
cybersecurity surveys is that those who answer the 
questions “self-select” and we do not know if their 
experience is the same as those who chose not 
to respond. Companies that have concealed large 
losses, for example, might choose to not respond, 
introducing a possible source of distortion into  
the survey. 
4 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,713478-6,00.html 
5 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5645869,00.html;  
http://intelnews.org/tag/berthold-stoppelkamp/
6 Ref to Ross Anderson paper
Estimating the Cost 
of Cybercrime and  
Cyber Espionage
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In this initial report we attempted to scope the 
problem and discuss what to count in estimating 
losses from cybercrime and cyber espionage. We 
looked at physical analogies—pilferage rates for 
example—to help us in measuring the loss from 
malicious cyber activities. We attempted to break 
malicious cyber activity into component parts. The 
aggregate of these parts would let us measure the 
total cost to societies of malicious cyber activities, 
but for each of the components of the cost of 
malicious cyber activities category, data is weak or 
nonexistent and any estimate must be approached 
with this limitation in mind. The components are:
• The loss of intellectual property. 
• Direct financial loss from cybercrime. 
• The loss of sensitive business information  
(such as negotiating strategies), including 
possible stock market manipulation.
• Opportunity costs, including service disruptions, 
reduced trust online, the spending required to 
restore any “lead” from military technology lost 
to hacking, and the realignment of economic 
activity as jobs flow out of “hacked’ companies.
• The additional cost of securing networks and 
expenditures to recover from cyber attacks.
• Reputational damage to the hacked company.
Intellectual Property Losses
The most important area for loss is in the theft 
of intellectual property and business-confidential 
information—economic espionage. It is difficult, 
however, to precisely estimate the losses. This is 
in part because cyber spying is not a zero-sum 
game. Stolen information is not really gone. Spies 
can take a company’s product plans, its research 
results, and its customer lists today, and the com-
pany will still have them tomorrow. The company 
may not even know that it no longer has control 
over that information. 
There are many ways to determine the value of 
intellectual property. One is to estimate what it 
would fetch on the market if offered for sale or 
for licensing. Companies can value their intellec-
tual property by determining the income streams it 
produces and is expected to produce in the future. 
Companies can also estimate what it would cost 
to replace intellectual property as a means of 
estimating its value, although a reliance on inputs 
for estimating value can be very misleading.7 The 
actual value of intellectual property can be quite 
different from the research and development costs 
incurred in creating it. If a company spends a  
billion dollars on a product that fails in the market, 
and a foreign power steals the plans, the loss 
is not a billion dollars but zero—the invention’s 
market value.8 
The Components of Malicious Cyber Activity
7 CRS, The Economic Impact of Cyber-Attacks, April 1, 2004
8 http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/value_ip_intangible_assets.htm
The most important area for loss is in the theft 
of intellectual property and business confidential 
information—economic espionage
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Extracting information from a computer network 
does not always mean there is immediate benefit 
to the acquirers. They may lack the advanced 
manufacturing capacity or skill needed to produce 
military or high tech products. For some advanced 
technologies, there may be a lag of five to ten 
years between the theft of the IP and when it 
appears as a competing product. This lag in the 
use of pilfered intellectual property complicates 
the estimation of loss from malicious cyber activity. 
The rate at which a competing product based on 
stolen intellectual property appears varies from 
sector to sector. Some take years. Others, such 
as high speed trains or wind power generators, 
appear rapidly. In some cases, acquirer of the 
technology has been able to put a product on the 
market before the victim can introduce their own, 
legitimate version.
One way to put these possible losses in context 
is to consider a US company with $1 billion in 
intellectual property, all of which is extracted by 
foreign hackers and given to a competitor. This 
competitor now has the advantage of access to 
valuable intellectual property for which it did not 
have to pay. However, if the competitor that ille-
gally acquired the intellectual property is unable to 
develop a competing product, the theft does not 
create additional risk for the victim. To suffer loss, 
the acquiring company would have to use  
the IP in a way that harms the victim, by offering  
a competing product or by improving their bottom 
line through reduced R&D costs.9
Making high tech products requires “know-how” 
as much as blockbuster IP—knowing how to run a 
manufacturing process, where to buy the cheapest 
inputs, which customers are most interested, what 
designs actually move product, etc. All of those 
things hold back companies that rely on cyber 
espionage. But if the company can ask each time 
they hit a roadblock, “How did the victim get over 
this barrier?” and then go back find the answer  
in the victim’s files, then they can quickly acquire 
the practical know how to use the stolen IP. 
Historically, state sponsored commercial espionage 
has focused on areas of great interest to govern-
ments, such as military and advanced technologies. 
More recently, some countries seem to use cyber 
espionage as a normal part of business. Cyber 
espionage by nation states to benefit their compa-
nies is a kind of state aid to those companies that 
is cheaper than traditional subsidies. This priva-
tized espionage can be deployed against a much 
broader swath of companies. One interview with 
intelligence officials told of a US furniture company 
being hacked and losing its IP, only to see furni-
ture made from its designs being offered online 
9 http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/177189
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to wholesalers. There are similar stories involving 
efforts to use cyber techniques in attempts to 
acquire breakfast cereal recipes, running shoe  
designs, automobile part technologies, and soft 
drink formulas. These are not “strategic industries,” 
but their losses from cyber espionage can still  
be significant. 
The victim company still has access to the 
intellectual property. It has not lost the ability to 
make the product; what has in fact happened is 
that it now faces a new competitor. The risk of 
this competition is increased if the new foreign 
competitor has access to other government 
subsidies that allow it to sell at a lower price or if 
it is supported in its domestic market by barriers 
that hamper outside companies from competing. 
We need, in our assessment of the cost of cyber 
espionage, to put it in the larger context of national 
economic and trade policy to understand the 
possible consequences.
Business Confidential Information
The line between Business Confidential  
Information and IP is inexact. Business Confidential 
Information can include trade secrets or “know 
how.” These categories are similar to IP and their 
loss imposes similar costs. We distinguish between 
IP—information that makes it easier to produce  
a competing product and Business Confidential  
Information—information that give an advantage 
in commercial negotiations or in developing  
competing business strategies. 
While it may take years for stolen IP to show up  
in a competing product, there is no delay in mon-
etizing stolen confidential business information. 
Theft of oil exploration data, sensitive business 
negotiation data, or even, insider stock trad-
ing information can be used immediately by the 
acquirer. The damage to individual companies can 
be great. Measuring this category of loss is very 
difficult since the victim may not know the reason 
they were underbid, a negotiation went badly, or 
a contract was lost. 
A more insidious form of hacking is the equiva-
lent of insider trading. In this case, the individual 
extracting non-public information about a future 
financial transaction is not an insider, but the 
effect is the same. Insider trading, or its hacking 
equivalent, may look like a victimless crime but it 
reduces social welfare and harm financial markets. 
An astute hacker may manipulate stock prices or 
automated trading systems, putting out false news 
that could affect a price or the market. The effect 
may be short lived, but a hacker could execute 
trades planned in advance. In the case of stock 
manipulation, the cyber crime resembles insider 
trading which can be notoriously difficult to 
detect. The information acquired could be used to 
make trades on another exchange, complicating 
enforcement efforts. 
Cybercrime 
While losses due to cybercrime are troubling, they 
do not directly threaten national security, except 
to the extent that international cybercrime allows 
potential opponents to train and maintain proxy 
forces at others expense. Direct losses to consum-
ers may be the smallest component of the cost of 
malicious cyber activity. These are usually based  
on impersonating individuals to gain access to 
their financial resources or other forms of fraud, 
such as impersonating an antivirus company in 
order to persuade individuals to pay to have their  
computers cleaned. 
The UNODC estimates that identity theft is the 
most profitable form of cyber crime, generating 
perhaps $1 billion per year in revenue on a global 
basis.10 The same UNODC report estimated that 
the cost of identify theft using cyber techniques in 
the US was $780 million (data for other countries 
was not readily available). Data on other kinds of 
losses by banks is not readily available, but may 
total in the US, somewhere between $300 million 
and $500 million a year. This is not an insubstan-
tial loss and if it occurred on our streets there 
would be an immense outcry. However, financial 
institutions have regarded this as the cost of doing 
business in cyberspace.11 
Service disruptions, such as denial of service  
attacks, may have only a limited cost on a national 
economy (although they can be disruptive for the 
company that experiences them). If the website 
of an online retailer is taken offline, they will lose 
sales, but the actual economic effect may be much 
smaller. Consumers may simply defer a purchase, 
10 http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/organized-crime.html, https://
www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/10.Cybercrime.
pdf. This figure does not include the theft of intellectual property  
11 http://www.frbsf.org/banking/audioconf/031413/Call-the-Fed- 
Cybercrime-3-14-13.pdf
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or they may go to another retailer. Even a rela-
tively large denial of service attack, such as those 
launched against Estonia in 2007, may have only a 
minimal economic effect. The same is true for ex-
tortion schemes where a criminal threatens a denial 
of service attack or penetrates a network, encrypts 
data, and then charges a fee for decryption. 
A Cambridge University survey of phishing esti-
mated, using figures from Gartner, that the net 
cost of identity theft for an individual victim is 
$572, came up with an estimate of $178 million in 
losses for the 1,400 phishing sites it surveyed. They 
estimate the total cost to consumers of phishing at 
$350 million per year. A Gartner report estimated 
that total annual losses from phishing reached 
$2 billion per year.12 The variation in estimates is 
explained by the differing assumptions used by 
Cambridge and Gartner. Other estimates conclude 
that less than one percent of the victims of phish-
ing actually lose money.13 
A survey of online retailers led to an estimate of 
$3.5 billion in 2012 for online fraud. As compa-
nies have moved to deploy anti-fraud measures, 
the rate of fraud has fallen by half, from 1.8% 
in 2004 to 0.9% in 2012. In contrast, losses for 
mobile commerce are higher, at 1.4%, and these 
losses are a growing concern for retailers.14 The 
overall cost to a national economy is small and 
would be considered just another form of pilferage 
if it were not for the risk that these actions could 
lead to a widespread distrust of the internet and 
subsequent inability to make further use of it to 
gain business efficiencies. This has not occurred 
but it remains a worry for governments.15 We 
could quantify this risk by determining the future 
expected value of internet transactions and the 
probability that this value would decline if con-
sumers perceived increased risk in internet use.
Cybercrime creates social costs. A website hosting 
child pornography or advocating terrorism imposes 
real costs on society. The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the costs of implementing 
a law to fight child pornography at roughly $30 
million a year.16 This estimate does not of course 
measure the psychological trauma and “spillover” 
costs that these activities generate. Intangible 
costs arise from the suffering of the victims, but 
this concept needs some adjustment for malicious 
cyber action. Companies are not persons, although 
employees or shareholders may suffer as a result  
of damage from malicious cyber actions (if they are 
aware that this is the cause). Efforts to estimate the 
cost of intangible suffering for other crimes suggest 
another caveat. While average intangible costs may 
range from millions of dollars for murders to a few 
dollars for larceny, the intangible costs of forgery 
fraud or embezzlement are either low or difficult 
to estimate.17 
12 An Empirical Analysis of the Current State of Phishing Attack and 
Defence;  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/weis07-phishing.pdf p.16
13 http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/how-many-people-fall-victim-to-
phishing-attacks/5084
14 http://www.internetretailer.com/2013/03/28/online-fraud-costs- 
e-retailers-35-billion-2012
15 The new EU cybersecurity strategy refers to this risk 
16 http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/hr6063.pdf
17 Intangible costs for stolen property offenses, vandalism, forgery 
and counterfeiting, embezzlement, and fraud cannot be calculated 
using available sources. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2835847/#R12 see Table 4 in particular; https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/pr/188070.pdf
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Reputational Damage
While companies fear reputation damage, there 
has been little work to quantify it. Companies 
suffer reduced valuation after public reporting of 
their being hacked, usually in the form of a drop 
in stock prices. These losses can be significant—
ranging from 1% to 5%—but appear not to be 
permanent. Stock prices usually recover by the 
next quarter. It would distort any calculation of 
loss to attempt to include these fluctuations in 
stock prices. However, it will be interesting to see 
if this changes as a result of new SEC regulations 
that require companies to report major hacking 
incidents, which may improve shareholder 
understanding about what hacks are commercially 
material. Shareholders are unlikely to have good 
information about what was taken, let alone by 
whom and for whose benefit. Recovery of stock 
prices may not be so quick if investors decide that 
there has been significant damage to a company’s 
intellectual property portfolio or if it sees a 
significant outflow of customers as a result. 
Increased Cost of Security 
It is also necessary to consider, as some studies 
have done,18 expenditures on cybersecurity as 
part of the total cost of cyber espionage and cyber 
crime. One estimate predicts that governments and 
companies spend perhaps 7% of their information 
technology budgets on security. Another estimate 
put annual spending globally on cybersecurity 
software at $60 billion, growing at about 8% a 
year.19 The US Office of Management and Budget 
reported that in 2012, federal agencies spent 
more than $15 billion on cybersecurity-related 
projects and activities, accounting for 20% of all 
federal spending on information technology.20 
As Anderson, et al put it in their very useful 
study, “We are extremely inefficient at fighting 
cybercrime; or to put it another way, cyber-crooks 
are like terrorists or metal thieves in that their 
activities impose disproportionate costs  
on society.”21 
Companies will always have to spend on 
cybersecurity, but if we assume that some 
percentage of the current spending would be 
unnecessary in a more secure cyber environment, 
that additional spending counts as part of the 
total cost. Determining this “risk premium” for 
malicious cyber actions faces all the estimation 
problems in other categories of loss, but one 
initial reference point would be that companies 
spent almost a $1 billion in 2012 to insure 
against the risk of social media attacks, privacy 
breaches, cyber crime and cyber espionage.22 
This relatively low figure may reflect imperfection 
in the insurance market as much as company 
perceptions of cyber risk.23 
The cost of cleaning up after a cyber attack may 
be relatively small. One survey found an average 
of about $9 million for large companies to clean 
up after a successful breach.24 Many of those 
incidents were of the lost-laptop variety, and one 
might expect the costs of curing actual cyber 
espionage intrusions to be much higher. One area 
for further research is increased insurance costs, as 
companies seek to control liability for breaches of 
their networks.
Opportunity Costs
A calculation of the cost of malicious cyber 
activity would need to consider opportunity costs, 
forgone opportunities, or lost benefits that would 
otherwise have been obtainable for activities in 
18 Anderson et al, Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime, Workshop on the 
Economics of Cybersecurity, 2012, http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/
papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf and  http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf  
19 Nicole Perlroth, Outmaneuvered at Their Own Game, Antivirus Makers 
Struggle to Adapt, New York Times, December 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/01/01/technology/antivirus-makers-work-on-
software-to-catch-malware-more-effectively.html?pagewanted=all; 
Gartner, Inc., http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2156915,  
“Gartner Says Security Software Market Grew 7.5 Percent in 2011,” 
April 26, 2012, http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1996415
20 H.R. 1163, Federal Information Security Amendments Act of 2013  
21 http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf
22 Global cyber risk premiums near $1 billion, 15 October 2012, http://
insurancenews.com.au/local/global-cyber-risk-premiums-near-1-billion
23 http://www.zyen.com/component/content/article.html?id=966   
24 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/100812-ponemon- 
cyberattacks-263113.html  
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cyberspace. Additional spending on cybersecurity 
that would not be required in a more secure 
environment is one example of an opportunity 
cost. Other examples include lost sales or lower 
productivity, a decision to avoid the internet for 
some activities. 
A survey cited in the European Commission  
Cybersecurity Strategy Document found that almost 
a third of Europeans are not confident in their abil-
ity to use the internet for banking or purchases and 
avoid revealing personal information because of 
security concerns (the greatest fear is over identity 
theft for purposes of financial fraud).25 A 2008 
Study commissioned by the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) found “grow-
ing public concerns about information security 
hinder the development of both markets and public 
services.”26 A 2006 global survey taken by the 
International Telecommunication Union as part of 
its campaign to play a greater role in cybersecurity, 
based on 400 respondents, found that at that time, 
more than 40% of Internet users avoided some 
online transactions because of security concerns.27 
None of these figures are determinative, but they 
suggest that there could be forgone opportunities 
in the use of the internet for commercial purposes 
because of security concerns. 
We must balance the results of these surveys by 
noting that internet use continues to grow. When 
interviewed, individuals express fear or concern 
but they do not change their behavior. Presumably, 
internet use could grow at some faster rate if it 
was more secure. It might be better to say that 
weak cybersecurity does not lead people to avoid 
the internet, but distorts how they use it, leading 
them to use it for lower value activities than 
would otherwise be the case. This “distortion” 
of internet use into lower value activities might 
be one of the most damaging aspects of cyber 
espionage and crime.
One opportunity cost usually not considered 
in estimating the damage of cyber crime is the 
effect on innovation in the receiving country. 
The theft of intellectual property is a transfer of 
wealth and knowledge from the victim country 
to the recipient, improving its ability to produce 
goods at a lower cost, but it is also likely that this 
creates disincentives in the recipient country for 
expanding its own innovative capabilities. This is a 
corollary to the bromide about teaching a man to 
fish rather than giving him fish. A man who steals 
technology will not learn how to create it himself, 
and eventually the victim of the theft will stop 
creating new technology as well. One possibility is 
that cyber espionage harms the recipient country, 
by disincentivizing innovation, and harms the 
global capacity to innovate, by both lowering 
the returns for innovators in the victim country 
(and thus discouraging them) and by reducing 
the resources and incentives for innovation in 
the target country. From this perspective, weak 
cybersecurity does global harm. 
We have not included one potential category 
of loss—the cost of the “pain and suffering” 
experienced by the victim. These costs are usually 
assigned by a court and while some are fixed  
(such as the cost of a human life in a crash) others 
can vary widely. 
25 2012 Special Eurobarometer 390 on Cybersecurity, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_390_en.pdf  
26 http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/MooreSecurity.pdf
27 http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2006/09.html
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Analogies use a “proxy” number rather than 
a direct measurement of the phenomena we 
want to understand. We cannot get data on IP 
losses, but there is good data on store pilferage, 
for example, that may let us measure a business 
decision, the level at which companies decide that 
losses from an illegal activity are tolerable (noting 
the difference between high value intangible 
property and consumer goods). Any proxy is an 
imperfect facsimile of what we really want to 
measure, and we need to ask how closely the 
proxy tracks: knowing how much gas a consumer 
buys could be a proxy for how many miles they 
drive, but the results would vary by car model. 
We would either need a credible “average” gas 
mileage for all cars or specific data on the types 
of cars (and their mileage per gallon) that are 
being driven. Our hope is that by looking at similar 
problems that are better documented, like crime 
and disease, we can derive an initial and rough 
estimate of “ballpark” figures for the costs of 
malicious cyber activities. 
Analogies can provide an idea of the scope of 
the problem,28 perhaps allowing us to set rough 
bounds—a ceiling and a floor—for the cost of 
malicious cyber activity, by comparing it to other 
kinds of crime and loss. In looking for analogies 
that may usefully be compared to malicious 
cyber activity, we start from the proposition 
that people will accept substantial costs if they 
perceive a much greater benefit. Department 
stores encourage shoppers to touch goods 
without a salesman present because that boosts 
sales, even though it also makes shoplifting 
more likely. Similarly, we all have embraced 
automobiles despite the risk of crashes. Clearly, 
societies continue to embrace digitalization 
despite the risks of cybercrime. The question 
is whether “tolerated” costs like pilferage or 
automobile accidents can be used as a guide to 
the “tolerated” cost of cybercrime. 
• Car Crashes: The Center for Disease Control 
estimated (using much better data), the cost of 
car crashes in the US at $99 billion in 2010. The 
American Automobile Association estimated the 
cost of 2010 car crashes at $168 billion. One way 
to think about the costs of malicious cyber activ-
ity is that Americans bear the cost of car crashes 
as a tradeoff for the convenience of automobiles; 
similarly they may bear the cost of cyber crime 
and espionage as a tradeoff for the benefits of 
information technology. That does not mean it is 
not in the national interest to try to reduce this 
loss, and the analogy is imprecise as the theft 
of sensitive military technology creates damage 
Using Analogy to Set the Bounds  
for the Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity
28 http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-
investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf   
using a “pilferage” approach that 
assumed the same rate of loss for malicious 
cyber activity would put the upper limit 
somewhere between 0.5% and 2% of 
national income. for the uS, this would be 
$70 billion to $280 billion.
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whose full cost is not easily quantifiable in mone-
tary terms. As with car crashes, we may also wish 
to consider if the monetary costs accurately reflect 
the cost of “pain and suffering” experienced by 
the victim if they realize they have been hacked.
• Piracy: A weakly governed space exploited  
by criminals could describe some oceanic areas 
as well as the internet. The Somali coast is 
the best known example but there are other 
locations. The International Maritime Bureau, a 
nongovernmental organization that is part of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, tracks 
incidents of piracy around the world. It estimated 
the annual cost of piracy as somewhere between 
$1 billion and $16 billion in 2005 (apparently 
cyber is not the only field where estimation is 
difficult). Another group estimated that piracy 
cost the global economy between $7 to $12 
billion in 2010.29 There are also human costs 
that are not reflected in these estimates that 
include captivity for long periods and in a few 
instances, death among the crews of ships 
seized by pirates, increased insurance costs, and 
opportunity costs as captured ships are unable  
to earn income and often damaged. To put these 
figures in context, the annual value of maritime 
trade in 2005 was $7.8 trillion, which means 
piracy costs equaled at most 0.02 percent of the 
total and probably less.30 
• Pilferage: Another approach to estimating  
loss might begin by noting that many industries 
have reacted lethargically to cyber espionage. 
Perhaps these companies have made a rational 
calculation, similar to that made by retail stores, 
that the cost of preventing all losses is simply 
greater than the losses themselves. Companies 
accept rates of “pilferage” or “inventory shrink-
age” as an operating cost. For retail companies 
in the US, this falls between 1.5% and 2.0% 
of annual sales—a 2008 estimate put pilferage 
losses at 1.7%. Using a “pilferage” approach 
that assumed the same rate of loss for mali-
cious cyber activity would put the upper limit 
somewhere between 0.5% and 2% of national 
income. For the US, this would be $70 billion 
to $280 billion. It is possible that companies 
may have made a rational calculation of where 
it makes business sense to improve their cyber 
defenses, similar to that made by retail  
stores on pilferage.31 A central problem for  
the “pilferage theory,” however, is that many  
companies do not know the extent of their  
losses, leading to a rational business decision 
based on inadequate information. 
• Crime and Drugs: One frequently heard com-
parison is that malicious cyber activity is more 
lucrative than the drug trade. This begs the ques-
tion of whether we actually know the value of 
the drug trade. In October 2012 the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime estimated the cost of all 
transnational organized crime as $870 billion, or 
1.2% of global GDP.32 It estimated $600 billion 
of this figure came from illegal drug trafficking. 
The remaining $270 billion accounts for all other 
kinds of transnational crime, including human 
trafficking, smuggling, and cyber crime. In places 
where the drug trade flourishes, we can see 
marked social and economic effects. Cyber crime 
does not produce similar observable effects. Say-
ing that malicious cyber activity generates more 
than $600 billion seems to be an exaggeration. 
The Limits of Analogy
If we are right in assuming that “tolerated costs” 
from malicious cyber activity falls into the same 
range as car crashes, pilferage, and drugs, this 
provides ballpark figures setting a “ceiling” for any 
estimate of loss from cybercrime. They seem to 
suggest that the most that cybercrime and cyber 
espionage could cost is 1% or less of GDP. This 
rests on untested assumptions about how cyber 
activities correlate with other tolerated losses, and 
on the extrapolation of broad trends from a few 
uncertain data points, the utility of illicitly acquired 
IP, and the accuracy of reported losses from cyber 
crime and espionage. It likely overestimates the 
losses to developing nations, which are neither as 
IP-intensive nor as reliant on networks. Any loss 
is likely not distributed evenly across firms and 
countries, suggesting that some individual nations 
and companies bear a heavier burden. As with 
any modeling effort, vary the assumptions and the 
model’s output will be different. Greater precision 
in these assumptions could lead to significantly 
different results, but any estimate that goes 
beyond this ceiling deserves careful scrutiny. We 
welcome comments and criticism of this approach.
29 http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/documents_old/
The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf 
30 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/
RAND_MG697.pdf   
31 http://dcipattorney.com/2010/12/the-us173-4b-global-intellectual-
property-marketplace/  
32 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/October/
transnational-crime-proceeds-in-billions-victims-in-millions-says-
unodc-chief.html 
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What’s the Harm?
This initial research suggest an upper limit of the 
cost of cyber espionage and crime somewhere 
between 0.5% and 1% of national income—for 
the US, this would be about $70 billion to $140 
billion. A lower limit might be $20 billion to $25 
billion. This is a very broad range and we hope 
that our future work can narrow it. A starting 
point for a better estimate would be to reduce the 
reliance on anecdotes and surveys, and begin to 
compile and compare existing estimates, develop 
better data on value, and refine assumptions 
about loss. While a precise single figure for 
the cost of cyber crime and cyber espionage is 
unattainable, a more accurate estimate of the 
range of potential losses can be developed, 
allowing us to better measure the problem.
A very crude extrapolation would be to take 
this range for the US, which accounts for a little 
more than a fifth of global economic activity, and 
come up with a range of $100 billion to $500 
billion for global losses. This is almost certainly 
an overestimate. An initial adjustment would be 
to note that less developed economies rely less 
on networks and have less intangible property 
than developed economies. In just the ten leading 
economies the value of “intangible” goods and 
services ranges from 50% to 70% of GDP; taking 
this into account would suggest a range of $80 
billion to $400 billion in global losses. This range is 
so broad we offer them only as a starting point for 
further research on the global effect of malicious 
cyber activity. In the context of a $70 trillion global 
economy, these losses are small, but that does 
not mean it is not in the national interest to try to 
reduce the loss, and the theft of sensitive military 
technology creates damage whose full cost is not 
easily quantifiable in monetary terms. 
We also need to disentangle the ordinary transfer 
of technology that is a normal part of foreign 
investment. Cyber espionage is best seen as a 
troubling addition to this larger trend of global 
technology transfer. We do not want to ascribe 
all technology transfer and increases in foreign 
competitiveness to cyber espionage, nor do we 
want to ignore the possibility that cyber espionage 
can, over the long term, dramatically affect on 
economic growth, where even a few tenths of 
a percentage point over a number of years can 
change a nation’s economic health.
Companies have likely underestimated the risk 
they face. Some companies believe that the 
damage from espionage is tolerable, part of 
the cost of doing business in the world’s fastest 
growing markets, and that they can “run faster,” 
to create new technologies and so minimize 
any loss. There may have been an economic 
rationale for this, in that for an individual firm, 
there are near term gains. But illicit technology 
transfer, even if the technology is dated by US 
standards, accelerates military modernization. It 
accelerates improvements in indigenous industrial 
and technological capabilities, making the 
recipient better able to absorb stolen technology 
in the future and produce competitive products. 
Companies risk losing not just their strategic 
advantage, not just intellectual property but also 
customer lists, their competitive analyses, and 
sales data.
The dollar value of malicious cyber activity may 
understate the actual damage if there is a “multi-
plier effect.” There are proponents of government-
funded research who argue strenuously, albeit 
self-interestedly, that a dollar spent on research 
produces more than a dollar of economic benefit. If 
this is true, the multiplier effect for cyber espionage 
could be far greater if the research is acquired for 
free. The loss of a dollar of IP due to cyber espionage 
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could produce more than a dollar of benefit for  
a foreign competitor. If this is accurate, the lost of 
$20 billion in intellectual property translates into 
a much greater benefit for the acquiring nation. 
But this is uncertain ground, as the estimation of 
a multiplier effect remains in dispute in economic 
literature. Some economists assert that one  
dollar spent on biomedical research, for example, 
produces two dollars in benefits. Other estimates 
by critics of the multiplier effect suggest that one 
dollar in spending may have a multiplier effect  
of only 80 cents or even less.33 
As noted earlier, another difficulty lies in quantify-
ing the dollar cost of damage to national security. 
First, there is a link between cyber espionage and 
the development of cyber attack capabilities. Cyber 
espionage provides, if nothing else, knowledge of 
potential targets and training for attackers. Second, 
there is a link between cyber espionage directed at 
commercial targets and cyber espionage targeted 
on military technology. It is often the same actors 
pursuing a collection plan that targets both military 
and commercial sources. In the US, for example, 
a strong case could be made that there has been 
extensive damage to the US lead in stealth, subma-
rine, missile, and nuclear capabilities. We cannot ac-
curately assess the dollar value of the loss in military 
technology but we can say that cyber espionage, 
including commercial espionage, shifts the terms  
of engagement in favor of foreign competitors. 
Terms of Trade and the Effect on Employment
Terms of trade refers to how much a country 
must export in order to pay for its imports. If 
imports fall in value, the terms of trade shift in 
favor of the importing country, as it will have to 
export fewer goods than before to pay its bills. 
Before we leap to the conclusion that stolen 
intellectual property will eventually mean lower 
prices for consumers, we should consider several 
caveats. First, many people will find it absurd to 
take account of the “benefits” of criminal acts. 
Second, cyber espionage reduces the comparative 
advantage of research, education, and know-how, 
making it harder for victim nations with advanced 
economies to produce the goods they need to pay 
their import bills. Even though the effect of cyber 
espionage is to “subsidize” foreign production, 
the benefits to consumers in the victim country  
are likely to be small. 
If the workers displaced by cyber espionage 
do not find jobs that pay as well or better, the 
victim country would be worse off. Analysis by 
the Commerce Department’s International Trade 
Administration found that in 2011, $1 billion 
in exports equaled 5,080 jobs.34 Since the total 
number of workers in the United States ranges 
between 135 million to 145 million, this means 
that the high-end estimate of $100 billion in 
losses from cyber espionage would translate 
into 508,000 lost jobs and the effect of cyber 
espionage on employment might be roughly a 
third of a percent decrease in employment. 
Rather than the aggregate number of jobs, 
the real concern might be if the lost jobs are in 
manufacturing or other high paying sectors. The 
effect of cyber espionage may be to move US 
workers from high paying blue collar jobs into 
lower paying work or even unemployment. More 
importantly, if our rough estimates of loss and 
of the cost in jobs are right, and since they are 
relatively small, it may point to the real damage 
from the theft of intellectual property. The greatest 
damage and risk from malicious cyber activity may 
not be in terms of direct damage to the victim 
country, but the illicit benefit obtained by the 
acquiring country, whose economic development 
and ability to compete globally (economically and 
perhaps militarily) are increased and accelerated 
through illegitimate means.
33 http://www2.isu.edu/headlines/?p=1283;  http://www.bea.gov/
regional/rims/brfdesc.cfm; Barro,  http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123258618204604599.html   
34 International Trade Administration, Jobs Supported by Exports: An 
Update, March 12, 2012, http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/
public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003639.pdf
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Next Steps for Estimation
We have identified important factors for 
determining the cost of malicious cyber activity. 
These factors may be quantifiable, but they rest 
on assumptions about the utility of illicitly acquired 
IP and the accuracy of reported losses from cyber 
crime and espionage. A precise single figure  
for the cost of cyber crime and cyber espionage  
is unattainable, but a more accurate estimate  
of the range of potential losses can be developed. 
We have also identified a number of issues that 
affect measurement and effect. Putting a number 
on the cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage is 
the headline, but the heart of the matter is the 
effect on trade, technology, and competitiveness. 
Our next report will provide a range of estimates, 
using a variety of techniques, models, and 
assumptions, but it will also assess these larger 
and more consequential effects. We plan in the 
final report to use data from other nations and 
refine our estimates of loss. In particular, we will 
analyze four fundamental questions:
• Can “tolerated cost” analogies of sufficient 
accuracy be developed to let us estimate the 
costs of cybercrime? One proxy of possible 
interest starts from the proposition that the 
implicit cost-benefit analysis of “tolerated costs” 
may be skewed by immediate gratification in 
the context of computer adoption. Individuals 
may willingly incur much heavier, and arguably 
irrational, losses if they are making choices 
between short-term gratification and long-term 
costs. Health care and other costs associated 
with preventable disease may fit this model. 
What costs are incurred as a result of life-style 
choices—smoking, obesity, lack of exercise—that 
many of us know are not healthy but which are 
irresistible in the moment. (Smoking of course is 
addictive, but so, some would say, is … excuse 
me but I have to check my Twitter feed.)
• Is the illicit acquisition of technology through 
cyber means a significant technology gain for the 
attackers that poses long-term costs to the victim 
economy, or does hacking produce only marginal 
changes in economic activity by both victim and 
attacker (noting that the effect on individual 
companies may be ruinous)?   
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• Do companies discount the cost as a normal part 
of business, or are they unaware of the real scale 
of loss and damage?
• Is dollar cost for losses an accurate measure of 
the effect of cyber espionage and cyber crime, or 
does this undervalue intangible costs, including 
trust in the international system or the effect on 
military power? 
Answering these larger questions, will help 
us scope the problem and put it in a strategic 
context. Cybercrime and cyber espionage cost the 
global economy billions of dollars every year. The 
dollar amount, large as it is likely to be, may not 
fully reflect the damage to the global economy. 
Cyber espionage and crime slows the pace of 
innovation, distorts trade, and brings with it the 
social costs associated with crime and job loss. 
This larger effect may be more important than any 
actual number and it is one we will focus on in  
our final report. 
Putting a number on the cost of 
cybercrime and cyber espionage is the 
headline, but the heart of the matter 
is the effect on trade, technology and 
competitiveness.
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